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Abstract—The explosion of ransomware in recent years has
served as a costly reminder that the malware threatscape has
moved from that of socially-inept hobbyists to career criminals.
This paper investigates the efficacy of dynamic opcode analysis
in distinguishing cryptographic ransomware from benignware,
and presents several novel contributions. Firstly, a new dataset
of cryptoransomware dynamic run-traces, the largest of its kind
in the literature. We release this to the wider research community
to foster further research in the field.
Our second novel contribution demonstrates that a short run-
length of 32k opcodes can provide highly accurate detection
of ransomware (99.56%) compared to benign software. Third,
our model offers a distinct advantage over other models in the
literature, in that it can detect a form of benign encryption (i.e.
file zipping) with 100% accuracy against not only ransomware,
but also the non-encrypting benignware in our dataset. The
research presented here demonstrates that dynamic opcode
tracing is capable of detecting ransomware in comparable times
to static analysis, without being thwarted by obfuscation tactics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with Brain, the first PC virus, in 1986, the
modern malware pandemic has escalated at an alarming pace.
This deliberately disruptive software was formerly the preserve
of hobbyists seeking infamy and bragging rights, but has
moved to enable a worldwide criminal ecosystem, providing
a rich platform for the extortion of individuals, businesses,
the public sector and even sovereign states. McAfee [1] state
that 1.5 million new ransomware samples were found in Q3
of 2017, a rise of 36% on the previous quarter. This drove
the total number of ransomware samples held by McAfee to
breach 12 million.
A. The rise of ransomware
Ransomware is deliberately malicious software that denies
or limits access to a machine or data, often with just enough
access to facilitate payment of the ransom demand. The
perfect storm of anonymous payment channels and internet
access, available encryption, and increased attack surface has
given criminals the opportunity to cash in on the recent
data explosion. The incessant demand for connected devices
and the subsequent exponential rise in data volumes has fast
outpaced security considerations, leaving low-hanging targets
for the exploitative[2].
Early versions of ransomware were largely unsuccessful, as
they faltered on one or more of the ‘perfect storm’ factors
mentioned previously. The AIDS PC virus from 1989 was
distributed via floppy disc, but used easily-breakable encryp-
tion and easily-traceable payment methods (a post office box).
However, even as recently as 2010, ransomware was viewed
by some authors as a non-event:
‘The ransomware phenomenon is a reality that has to be
monitored but in some ways it is not a mature and complex
enough activity that deserves such communication around
it. Ransomwares[sic] as a mass extortion mean is certainly
doomed to failure...may means[sic] that criminals have
evolved to something else and other sources of income.’[3,
P.90]
Latter-day ransomware has evolved dramatically, increasing
in aggression, sophistication and potential with each strain and
iteration.
In [4] Symantec listed the average ransom demand as $294
in 2015, rising to $679 in 2016. This, coupled with the
fluctuations in Bitcoin exchange rates, has helped to drive
the rise in ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). Here, customised
binaries are available for as little as $50 and a 10% cut of the
proceeds. With such a high potential return, and such ease of
access to the offending ransomware, the onslaught may only
be beginning. A shift from a shotgun approach to specific big-
ticket targets has lead to the ransom of the San Francisco metro
system, private healthcare practices, the UK National Health
Service, hotel key-cards, and specific Big Data stores. With
the data explosion and rapid increase in connected devices,
the prospect of escalating attacks is becoming all too real.
The remainder of this paper is presented as follows: Section
Two provides highlights of the literature to date on dynamic
analysis of malware and ransomware, and the objectives of
the present work. Section Three briefly describes the methods
used to generate the dataset for the present research and the
experimental analyses. Section Four presents the results of
our experiments and Section Five provides conclusions on the
importance of the results.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. Dynamic opcode analysis of malware
Research into overcoming issues inherent in signature de-
tection and obfuscation has focused on observing behaviours
of the malware at run-time. Opcodes (operation codes) are the
readable machine language instructions that perform CPU op-
erations. Monitoring the run-time opcodes provides a snapshot
of the malware’s behaviour, while circumventing obfuscation
strategies.
Santos et al [5] inspected n-grams (i.e. combinations of
observed opcode sequences) in a static analysis. Accuracy
and F-measure were reported as >85% in detecting malware
from benign. Runwal, Low and Stamp [6] found graph ap-
proaches to detecting metamorphic malware using opcodes to
be successful not only between metamorphic malware and
benignware, but metamorphic malware and other malware
types.
2O’Kane et al [7] found that 99.5% of variance in their data
was attributed to the top 8 opcodes, providing feature reduction
from the original 150 opcodes.
Carlin et al. [8] used run-time opcodes to classify 48,000
malware executables. The effects of run-length (i.e. trace
length) and n-grams were also analysed. The authors found
that traces of 32k opcode length using n=1 showed the highest
levels of accuracy (99.05%) using a Random Forest classi-
fier and 10-fold cross-validation. This indicates that dynamic
opcode analysis, when applied to a broad range of malware,
can speedily and accurately detect the malicious behaviours
of unseen malware.
B. Dynamic analysis of ransomware
Dynamic analyses of ransomware have mainly concentrated
on taint analysis and network monitoring. Ahmadian, Shahriari
and Ghaffarian [9] attempted to detect ransomware prior to
the malicious data encryption by detecting domain generation
algorithm (DGA) and key exchange activities. Ransomware
often employs a DGA to connect to a randomized domain, to
avoid hard-coding Command and Control (C&C) domains into
the malware. If the DGA generates the valid domain success-
fully, a connection is made to the C&C, and a key exchange
takes place. Using a text analysis approach, the authors sought
to check if a domain was probably being generated at random
using typical rules for English. This appears to be conceptually
flawed, as non-English domains, or even acronyms would
potentially be flagged. A second parallel approach monitored
traffic on outward network connections, allowing the user
the opportunity to deny attempted connections. The authors
claim 100% accuracy with 0 false negatives (FN) using their
framework. However, the dataset only contained 20 samples of
ransomware and the overall accuracy was actually 50% across
these 20. While a FN rate of 0 may have been observed, the
research did not examine benign files and so false positives
could not be reported.
Monika, Zavarsky and Lindskog [10] examined ransomware
on both Android and Windows. Using dynamic analysis, the
system changes and network communications of each sample
were observed. It was found that there was consistency in
approach across strains of ransomware, including file writes,
registry manipulation and network access.
Cabaj et al [11] investigated six CryptoWall samples dynam-
ically, focussing on the network activity, which allowed the
tracking of infected proxies and the infrastructure behind the
infection. This work was furthered in [12] with an expanded
dataset (350 instances). In this work, multiple domain names
resolved to the same IP addresses were found to be responsible
for multiple C&C services
Scaife et al [13] employed dynamic analysis on 492 ran-
somware samples from 14 families. Change-monitoring tech-
niques were used to analyse file type changes, similarity
measurement, entropy, file deletion, and file type funnelling.
Ransomware was detected with a 100% TP rate, with the
median file-loss due to encryption as low as 10 out of
5100 files. This model was then used with simulated user
behaviour on 30 Windows applications. The only FP the model
triggered was during benign packing and encryption by the
7Zip application.
Mbol et al. [14] employed entropy analysis to detect en-
cryption behaviour of TorrentLocker on JPEG files. With an
abnormal behaviour defined as belonging to a process that
opens a large number of files, and the structure of the output
differing from the input structure. The authors found that
the algorithm could differentiate between typical JPEGs and
encrypted JPEGs using only the first 128kb with 99.95%
accuracy. They postulated that, because sections of JPEGs
resemble encrypted files closely, more highly-structured files
(e.g. DOC or TXT) could be distinguished even more easily.
However, using the abnormal behaviour definition to diagnose
file-encryption by ransomware would mostly likely classify
typical benign compression or encryption behaviours as ma-
licious. Similarly, malware could bypass the first rule of that
definition by starting child processes for each file encryption.
Previous dynamic approaches to ransomware analysis have
largely focussed on the effects of the file on the host system,
rather than directly observing the behaviour of the file. For
example, monitoring the network traffic or file I/O behaviours
on disc, rather than instructions the executable is issuing. As
the latter technique has proven successful at distinguishing
malware from benignware in large datasets and with high
accuracy, it would seem logical that ransomware should also
yield to such analyses. The research presented here investigates
the application of these approaches to ransomware, using a
novel dataset with respect to the following research questions:
1) Can opcode counts extracted from runtraces offer accu-
rate ransomware detection over a large sample size?
2) Does a 32k opcode run-length offer superior accuracy
over full-length traces?
3) Can the method(s) which successfully detect(s) ran-
somware behaviour, differentiate these from benign en-
cryption (e.g. file zipping) behaviours?
III. METHODOLOGY
The methodology employed for the work presented here
uses the framework created in [8], with slight modifications
for use in the context of ransomware. For brevity, this process
is briefly restated here.
To acquire samples, the repository at VirusShare.com [15]
was selected for its size, modernity and facilities, with 40
million malware samples at the time of writing. For the present
paper, the cryptoransom collection was used, containing ap-
proximately 36,000 files. When PE files were extracted, 21,378
remained for the experiment. Benign files were harvested
from Windows machines, and the SMOTE algorithm [16]
was implemented to oversample the minority class, resulting
in 3,591 benign files. The benign zipping class was created
using 7Zip to pack and encrypt a collection of files. This
was oversampled to create a dataset of 1000 benign zipping
samples. A clean baseline snapshot of a Windows 10 Virtu-
alBox VM was used to execute each file for nine minutes.
This time was used to provide a pragmatic balance between
number of samples executed and execution time. The open
source debugger OllyDbg v2 was used to trace the dynamic
3TABLE I
MACHINE LEARNING METRICS FOR FULL-LENGTH BENIGN AND
RANSOMWARE TRACES
TP FP Precision Recall F MCC ROC PRC Class
0.972 0.002 0.989 0.972 0.98 0.977 0.998 0.995 Benign
0.998 0.028 0.995 0.998 0.997 0.977 0.998 1 Ransomware
0.994 0.025 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.977 0.998 0.999 Average
TABLE II
MACHINE LEARNING METRICS FOR 32K RUN-LENGTH BENIGN AND,
RANSOMWARE TRACES
TP FP Precision Recall F MCC ROC PRC Class
0.932 0.001 0.982 0.932 0.957 0.955 0.996 0.982 Benign
0.999 0.068 0.996 0.999 0.998 0.955 0.996 1 Ransomware
0.996 0.064 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.955 0.996 0.999 Average
opcodes of each file during runtime, with StrongOD v0.4.8.892
used to mask the presence of the debugger, as per [7]. The
host Windows OS was crafted to include the items found
in a typical system, including a full recycling bin, browsing
history, recent documents, Flash, .Net, Java etc. Further anti-
virtualization mitigations were not utilized at the execution
stage, as the presence of VBoxGuestAdditions is an easy
indicator of the system being under a virtualised environment,
but is necessary for automation. One main aim of dynamic
investigations of malware is to experience the binary as a user
would normally experience it, including virtualized platforms.
Lastly, the anti-virtualization attacks by malware may also
provide further useful features for detection when operating as
low level as opcode instructions. This dataset was then input
to a Random Forest classifier, as implemented in WEKA 3.9.
As this dataset is the largest dynamic opcode analysis of
ransomware, to the best of our knowledge, we wish to release
this dataset to the wider research community in order to
further the body of research into mitigating dangerous malware
threats.
IV. RESULTS
A. Benignware vs ransomware
To confirm past work that showed a 32k length run-trace
provided optimal accuracy with lower computational overhead,
both 32k run-traces (32k) and full-length run-traces (FL) were
compared. Table I shows the metrics for the full-length traces,
and Table II lists the metrics for the 32k set.
Overall the results show that the classifier can distinguish
between each class with high levels of accuracy. The F1
measure was 0.994 (FL) and 0.996 (32k) averaged across the
classes, indicating balance between both precision and recall.
The shorter run-length did, however, introduce higher levels
of FP ratings for ransomware, when compared to the full-
length traces. Area-under Receiver Operating Characteristic
curve (ROC) indicated excellent classification performance at
99.8% and 99.6% respectively.
B. Benignware vs ransomware vs zipping
To investigate whether the RF model can distinguish ran-
somware from benign encryption (zipping), a three-class prob-
lem was put to the classifier. Again, the 32k run-length was
TABLE III
MACHINE LEARNING METRICS FOR FULL-LENGTH BENIGN,
RANSOMWARE, AND BENIGN ENCRYPTION TRACES
TP FP Precision Recall F MCC ROC PRC Class
0.973 0.002 0.989 0.973 0.981 0.978 0.998 0.995 Benign
0.998 0.021 0.995 0.998 0.997 0.982 0.998 1 Ransomware
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 Zipper
0.995 0.018 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.982 0.998 0.999 Average
TABLE IV
MACHINE LEARNING METRICS FOR 32K RUN-LENGTH BENIGN,
RANSOMWARE, AND BENIGN ENCRYPTION TRACES
TP FP Precision Recall F MCC ROC PRC Class
0.932 0.001 0.98 0.932 0.956 0.954 0.996 0.981 Benign
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 Zipper
0.999 0.035 0.996 0.999 0.998 0.975 0.998 1 Ransomware
0.996 0.032 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.975 0.998 0.999 Average
compared to the full-length traces. As with the two class
problem above, the classification metrics showed excellent
performance in distinguishing the classes, with a TP rate of
99.6%. The highlight of these results is the 100% rating for
each score within the Zipper class, i.e. 100% of the time,
the classifier could distinguish not only benignware from
ransomware, but zipping from both other classes.
C. Accuracies
The accuracies (stated as correctly classified instances out
of all classifications) for each run-length (full vs 32k) and all
classes are depicted in fig 1. Investigating at the 32k run-length
shows higher accuracy levels than using the full-length traces,
for both the two-class and three-class analyses. As the zipping
class is detected with 100% accuracy, this has improved the
overall accuracy in the three-class analysis, with the other
classes showing almost identical results (Benign +0.1%) be-
tween the two-class and three-class problems. Overall, the 32k
run-length benign vs ransomware vs zipping analysis showed
the highest level of accuracy. Sheet2
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Fig. 1. Accuracies (correctly classified instances) for all classes and run-
lengths
4V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper makes several novel contributions to the current
body of knowledge. First, we present a dynamic opcode
analysis of ransomware on the largest dataset of its kind in the
literature, to the best of our knowledge. We wish to release
this dataset to the wider research community to help propagate
future work in the field.
Second, we confirm findings of our previous work that 32k
run-length is most accurate. This is important, particularly in
the context of ransomware, as speedy detection and mitigation
of the threat is key in preventing data loss. Further, this serves
as confirmation that our methodological decision to limit run-
time to nine minutes is more than adequate to capture the
vast majority of information required to enable a classifier to
correctly predict a class.
Third, the three-class problem showed the most accurate
results, due to the 100% accuracy of the zipping class. It is
widely accepted in machine learning that increasing numbers
of classes typically increases misclassification. Despite this,
the comparison of ransomware with benign and benign en-
cryption showed the highest accuracy. A key advantage of
this model over past work is the ability of our model to detect
ransomware, benignware and benign encryption behaviours,
with 100% accuracy in the latter case. Future work could
refactor this as a two-class problem, incorporating the benign
and zipping classes as one. Similarly, the ransomware class
could be investigated with respect to other non-cryptographic
malware.
This research confirms our past work into the advantages of
dynamic opcode analysis in the context of malware detection.
Within the realm of ransomware, fast detection is essential,
and our model demonstrates that short run-times are capable
of offering high detection rates, while mitigating obfuscation
techniques.
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